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Abstract: 
It is an academic truism that enlargement affected the functioning of the European Union 
and its institutions, and that effects of enlargement are especially noticeable in the Council 
and its sub-structures. Many researchers expected procedures in the Council to become 
more intergovernmental and decision-making to become more complicated. However, 
enlargement also contributed to institutional change in the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives in quite another—unexpected—way: it strengthened the influence of 
supranational and “quasi-supranational” actors within the Council, such as the 
Commission, the Presidency and the General Secretariat, and it made decision-making 
considerably easier in cases where profound national interests of the newcomers were not 
directly concerned. Four institutional mechanisms can be identified that contributed to this 
unexpected institutional evolution: The mechanism of socialization, the mechanism of 
specific and unspecific reciprocity, the mechanism of lack of interest and the mechanism of 
presidential impartiality. These mechanisms helped to overcome the cleavage between old 
and new as well as to uphold the strong and often cited esprit de corps within the Council 
and its preparatory bodies. The paper analyzes these processes and tries to answer the 
question: how did these mechanisms contribute to a kind of supranationalization of the 
Council and its substructures after the last rounds of enlargement? The analysis is based 
on 51 semi-structured, intensive interviews with experts from the Council General 
Secretariat and from member states’ Permanent Representations.  
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Introduction: The Surprising Absence of Deadlock in the Council
1
 
 
In May 2004 and in January 2007 twelve central, eastern and southern European 
countries joined the European Union. The process of integrating the new member 
                                                 
1 This paper is based on a quantitative survey on the Council acts as well as on the number of votes 
against and abstention within the Council from 1999 to 2006. In addition 51 extensive qualitative 
interviews have been done with representatives from the Council secretariat, from permanent 
representations and from national administrations in the field of the coordination of the national 
instructions that are sent to the permanent representations in Brussels.   2
states considerably challenged the functionality of the European Union’s 
institutions. Large-scale changes were expected to occur especially within the 
Council of the European Union and its preparatory bodies: the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives (Coreper) in its two manifestations, and the Council 
working groups: The total number of representatives in the Council almost doubled 
from 15 to 27 within less than three years. Several years before enlargement took 
place, it was feared that this biggest round of enlargement to date would severely 
affect the smooth running of decision-making processes in the EU. The then 
existing structure of the Union was universally perceived to be incapable of 
integrating the new member states; most scholars claimed, that the size of a group 
makes a difference and that ‘the smaller the circle of participants the better.‘
2 Many 
researchers feared, that the candid atmosphere, the feeling of mutual responsibility 
and the commitment to a higher—European—goal that has repeatedly been 
observed especially in Coreper would be in danger because of the expected greater 
cultural and linguistic diversity. Already in 2002, Jeffrey Lewis wondered, whether 
Coreper will “function the same in an EU of twenty-seven or more?” (Lewis 2002: 
295). The common and widespread expectation was that without fundamental 
reforms of the existing institutional structure of the EU, deadlock and a general 
incapability to act would most certainly be the consequence.
3 International media 
also confirmed the perception that without changes in the voting weights of 
governments and the extent of majority voting, the decision-making machinery 
designed for the six founding members back in 1957 will collapse. And even 
Council and Coreper members expected that “no Committee works efficiently with 
more than 11 members” (int. 21, 4-5). Consequently, during the period prior to the 
Intergovernmental Conference in Nice in 2000, representatives from EU member 
and candidate countries, political scientists, and the public debate pointed to 
extensive and profound changes in the institutions, decision-making processes, and 
even some of the guiding principles of the European Union as the prerequisites for 
enlargement. The result was the signing of the Treaty of Nice on 8 December 2000. 
Only days later, however, the perception arose that Nice had been a failure, and that 
the Union was not yet fit for enlargement. Indeed, the then-president of the 
European Commission, Romani Prodi, feared that enlargement based on the Treaty 
of Nice would result in more frequent blockades in the Council (‘Süddeutsche 
Zeitung’ 13 December 2000), and most commentators agreed that ‘rejoicing over 
securing enlargement … would be premature’ (‘Economist’ 11 December 2000). 
The final expectation was that the functioning of most EU institutions—but 
especially the Council—would be severely affected by the accession of the ten new 
                                                 
2 Puetter 2006: 24. See for Georg Simmels argument on groups size Simmel 1902 and Simmel 1908. 
For a more detailed analysis on how these changes affected the Coreper see Lempp 2007a. 
3 Deadlock, blockade or at least major problems with decision-making procedures in the Council 
have been predicted by many of scholars and practitioners; see e.g.  Hayes-Renshaw / Wallace 2003: 
8. See for a comprehensive analysis of the voting-behavior within the Council before and after 
enlargement Hayes-Renshaw et al. 2006. According to the German Foreign Affairs Minister at the 
time, Joschka Fischer, reform was even necessary to create the institutional preconditions for 
enlargement (‘Frankfurter Rundschau’ 1 December 2000).   3
member states in 2004. Despite the uncertainty of its ability to succeed, 
enlargement did proceed as outlined in the Treaty of Nice, and the European Union 
has been functioning with 25 member states for three years now and with 27 
member states since January 2007 – time to look at the facts and figures and see 
whether the feared deadlock has emerged or not. 
Within Coreper itself, actual voting occurs very rarely. However, the often quoted 
‘shadow of the vote’ lies upon every QMV-dossier, i.e. every dossier that can be 
decided with a qualified majority of votes in the Council. Hence, the possibility of 
voting in the Council changes the way how Coreper and the Council working 
parties treat a particular dossier. Contrary to expectations new member states have 
not caused a blockade of the Council and the feared voting-chaos has not emerged. 
Although the number of pieces of legislation passed by the Council sank from an 
average of 93 legal acts per presidency in the years between 1999 and 2003 to an 
average of 67 per residency after enlargement,
4 all interviewees universally reported 
that this was due not to enlargement but rather to an altered policy of the 
Commission to introduce fewer initiatives to the Council in order to avoid over-
regulation. 
Furthermore, it is not the case that after the May 2004 enlargement voting in the 
Council has become more divisive. Even though only 29% of the legislation passed 
by the Council formally requires a unanimous vote, about 90% is passed as such 
(2004: 89.1%; 2005: 90.2%; 2006: 89.9%). Consequently, the hypothesis that the 
new members would cause more dissent within the Council can clearly be 
disproved for the years 2004, 2005, and 2006. In addition, the percentage of 
legislation passed with abstention votes for 2004, 2005, and 2006 (8.3%, 9.8%, and 
8.8% of all acts, respectively) was also lower than that before enlargement. 
Legislation passed with both abstention and dissenting votes from 2001 to 2003 was 
more than 16%; this figure was clearly under 16% in the years 2004 and 2005 and 
only 16.9% in 2006 (see Figure 1). 
                                                 
4 These figures are based on the Monthly Summaries of Council Acts, which are publicly available: 
http://consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=551&lang=en (5.5.2007).    4
 
 
 
 
 
Obviously the often cited ‘consensus reflex’ is still working in the Council (Hayes-
Renshaw et al 2006: 183). And obviously the new member states’ ability to learn 
and to accept socialization pressures was surprisingly effective. Until November 
2006, only 20 times a new member state has voted against a decision that was 
passed (see figure 2).  
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Figure 1: The percentage of votes against and abstentions of all legislation passed in the 
Council from 1999 to 2006.   5
 
All member states that had joined the Union in 2004 have at least once voted 
against or abstained; however, at least three old member states have voted against 
much more often, especially Denmark (10 votes against), Sweden (7) and Greece 
(6). So, it is not the case that new member states do vote against or abstain more 
often than old member states. In truth, criticism of voting behaviour of the new 
member states could actually be directed toward that of old member states shortly 
before the enlargement. Statistics show that a striking amount of legislation was 
passed right before enlargement took place - assumingly because the decisions 
would have been harder to take once the new members were admitted. Between 
1999 and 2006, the month of April shows the Council passing an average of 12.3 
pieces of legislation.
5 In April 2004—the month before enlargement—it passed 
63—significantly more legislation than in any single month from 1999 until now. 
By contrast, the month of May from 1999 to 2006 shows the Council passing an 
average of 16.4 pieces of legislation, and in May 2004—the month the new 
members arrived—only one (see Figure 3). 
                                                 
5 Without April 2004. 
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Figure 2: The number of votes against and abstentions by new member states from May 2004 to December 2006.   6
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New members could not help but notice this as they had had observer status leading 
up to their entrance. The Antici of a new member state expressed it this way: 
‘Implicitly, a certain stigmatization can still be felt. For example, old member states 
made arrangements before the enlargement that can hardly be changed now’ (int. 
40, 30-32). However, due to specific mechanisms of socialization these fears of the 
old member states proved wrong and the overall conclusion is quite clear: “they 
have come in quiet smoothly” (int. 26, 57-58), as an ambassador from an old 
member state said, and consequently there was „no collapse of the Council system“ 
(int. 12, 45-46; int. 46, 69-72). Therefore the question arises: Why is there no 
deadlock in the Council in general and in its preparatory bodies in particular?  
The answer that this paper suggests is that the Council functions differently from 
the Council of Ministers in any other International Organization. It functions more 
as a quasi-supranational body than as a purely intergouvernmental forum. This 
again is surprising, because the Council is generally perceived as the 
intergouvernmental body of the Union par excellence and represents the 
governments of the member states. Much is pointing to the fact that this latter idée 
directrice (or basic orientation) of the Council was intended by the founders of the 
ECSC back in 1950 who wanted the Council to be an intergovernmental body to 
check against the supranationally oriented High Authority. However, a clear 
application of the term “intergovernmental” to the Council does not seem to fit 
anymore. Jeffrey Lewis argues that work in the Council and especially in the 
Council working parties and Coreper can be characterized by a strong trend to be 
community-focused. Today the Council is as much a supranational body as it is a 
intergovernmental institution. “While the Council may be intergovernmental in 
Figure 3: The number Council acts per month from 2003 to 2006.   7
inspiration and formal design, in practice it has developed an extensive 
supranational character through the largely overlooked dimension of informal 
integration” (Lewis 2003a: 1014f). How can this change – which was obviously not 
intended by the Union’s founders – be explained? 
Four institutional mechanisms
6 seem to be responsible for this process of 
supranationalization of the Council and therefore for its unexpectedly smooth 
running: the mechanism of socialization (i.e. a certain convergence of the idée 
directrice and of the preferences of Council members and officials in the permanent 
representations), the mechanism of the impartial Council Presidency, the 
mechanism of specific and unspecific reciprocity and the mechanism of lack of 
interest (i.e. the fact that member states that are not directly concerned by a decision 
tend to vote for the compromise proposed by the Presidency, the Commission or 
simply the majority of states). All four mechanisms will be presented in the 
following chapters.  
Mechanisms of Supranationalization in the Council  
What Supranationalization Is 
The term “supranational” is widely used in EU literature. However, it is not always 
used with the same meaning. Sometimes it is used as a specific “mode of 
governance” (e.g. Beate Kohler-Koch), sometimes it is interpreted as a property that 
is used for describing a specific type of interests of actors in the sense that 
“supranational interests” or “supranational preferences” take into account the 
common good for entities transcending the nation state, whereas “national interests” 
aim at the good for specific states. In law-literature the term “supranational” 
describes European legal acts that are superior to national law and – as in the case 
of European regulations – have direct effects on the national level. In addition, 
institutions are sometimes called “supranational” and thereby contrasted with 
“intergouvernmental” bodies, in case of the European Union in particular the 
Council. So the question is: Which type of units can be “supranational” or 
“intergouvernmental”, institutions, interests, legal acts or the basic principles (idées 
directrices) of institutions themselves? In this article the term supranational shall 
describe a quality of institutions. “Supranational” institutions are institutions that 
can take decisions which are relevant and binding for at least two different states. In 
addition supranational institutions are characterized by three distinguishing marks: 
1.  they possess the quality of an actor (instead of being merely a forum for 
national governments),  
2.  they can act (more or less) independently from the states they represent 
(instead of possessing only an imperative mandate)
7 and 
                                                 
6An institutional mechanism is a trinity of positions, rules and interests within an institution. 
Individual persons have specific interests and try to enforce them within the framework of the 
existing rules and positions (Patzelt 2003: 66ff). Thereby institutional mechanisms create reliable 
and predictable patterns of interaction.  
7 See for this conceptualization of the principle of representation Pitkin 1967.   8
3.  they can reach decisions by majority voting (and are not bound by the 
intergouvernmental principle of unanimous decision making).
8 
The opposite of a supranational institution is then an intergovernmental institution 
for which the Councils of Ministers in most international organizations are good 
examples. An often described problem for purely intergouvernmental bodies in 
international relations is the fact that unanimity in combination with an imperative 
mandate of the negotiator often leads to a inability to reach decisions, especially if 
there are many actors – and thus many veto players. Consequently, it is easier to 
reach decisions in supranational institutions than in intergouvernmental institutions. 
However supranationality necessarily implies at least a partial transfer of 
sovereignty from the level of the state to the level of the supranational body.  
In the case of the Council of the European Union it is not quite clear, whether it is a 
supranational or an intergouvernmental body. In some areas it clearly acts as an 
actor, in others it is hardly more than a forum for the representatives of the member 
states’ governments. Sometimes the decision rule is unanimity, sometimes it is 
qualified majority voting and sometimes the General secretariat or even the 
representatives from the permanent representations are really able to negotiate 
independently from capitals, although in theory, permanent representations always 
have to follow the instructions sent to them from their capitals. This dual nature of 
the Council, committed at the same time to two different – and conflicting – idées 
directrices was also expressed by Jean Monnet already in the early 1950s: “The 
Council of the European Union is the institution which represents the member states 
of the European Union. It provides a forum where representatives of Member State 
governments put forward their own national interests and seek to reach 
compromises. National viewpoints are aired at Council meetings, but the Council is 
also the institution responsible for identifying the general interests of the 
Community and translating them into acts.”
9  
The Mechanism of Socialization 
„There is no general theory of socialization explaining how institutional settings 
shape elite views about politics and society” (Hooghe, 1999, 439). However, in the 
context of the new wave of institutionalisms, three variants of neo-institutionalism 
deal specifically with socialization processes within institutional frameworks, 
sociological,
10 historical
11 and – more recently – evolutionary institutionalism.
12 
                                                 
8 One could add that they strife for a common (i.e. “supranational”) good, the welfare of the Union 
as a whole instead of a good position of their state within the Union (or whatever body they belong 
to). 
9 Speech by Jean Monnet, 8 December 1952, in: http://www.ena.lu/europe/european-union/speech-
jean-monnet-1952.htm (2 May 2007). See also for the conceptualization of the “dual nature” of the 
Council as a half supranational and half intergouvernmental body Lewis 1998. 
10 Sociological institutionalism goes back to Emile Durkheim (1988 [1902]), Ferdinand Tönnies 
(1972 [1867]), Max Weber (1985 [1922]) and Talcott Parsons (1968 [1937]) and Ralf Dahrendorfs 
conception of the “homo sociologicus” (1964). Also neofunctionalists emphasize the role of 
socialization for the step-by-step process of the supranationalization of the Union (c.f. Beyers, 1998, 
4; here: further explanations and authors). This view is shared by many authors, like e.g. Hayes-
Renshaw/Lequesne/Mayor-Lopez, 1989; Wessels, 1991; Westlake/Galloway, 2004. The widely   9
This paper bases on the theoretical assumptions of those approaches. In particular it 
presupposes that preferences of individual actors are at least partly shaped by 
institutional settings (sociological institutionalism), that institutional mechanisms 
and  niche turbulences can influence the basic foundations of institutions 
(evolutionary institutionalism), that incremental institutional change can still be 
fundamental and dramatic (historical institutionalism) and that institutions are 
always based on a “idée directrice”, which defines the fundamental purpose of an 
institution and, by it, legitimates the existence of the institution (institutional 
analysis).
13 Until now, theory-based approaches to the question of the surprising 
functionality of the enlarged Union with a specific focus on the Council and its sub-
structures are extremely rare.  
Knill and Lehmkuhl define three mechanisms of europeanization, one of them 
being the “europeanization through a cognitive re-conceptualization of national 
preferences” (see Holzinger/Knill/Peters/Rittberger, 2002b p. 158). This is exactly 
what can be described as the institutional mechanism of socialization within the 
Council.
14 This mechanism can be shortly described as follows: certain patterns of 
interaction – especially frequent interaction in a group that is characterized by 
mutual trust, a deliberative atmosphere and a feeling of togetherness (or “esprit-de-
corps”) – lead to changes in the role perceptions and to a diversification of loyalties 
among the group members. This might also influence the actual behaviour of those 
group members.  
In 1967 Emile Noël hypothesized that whoever worked in council working parties 
would think more positively about European integration at the end of his term than 
at the beginning. He called it “the natural consequence of the dynamism of the 
institutions” (Noël 1967: 225). Soon after the foundation of the ECCS Jean Monnet 
already observed: “The phenomenon that surprised me most was the change in 
attitude and preferences of the men around me. Every day I could see the appeal of 
the idea of the Community and its effects on people’s minds!” He goes on to say: 
“It was the European spirit […]. This European spirit turned upside down the way 
how people think” (Monnet 1988, 422, see also Hallstein, 1969, 66). Patterns of 
socializations could thus already be observed in the early days of European 
Integration. This was indeed empirically proved by a great variety of empirical 
research that finds the effectiveness of this mechanism in the Council working 
                                                                                                                                        
accepted hypothesis is that the mechanisms of socialization make national delegates more 
“European-minded” than they were before (especially those from the permanent representations, less 
those that take part in Council working group sessions directly from their national ministries). 
11 Thelen 2004; Mahoney/Rueschemeyer, 2003. 
12 Patzelt, 2007; Lempp, 2007b. 
13 Göhler 1997, Patzelt, 2002; Patzelt 2003. 
14 Others define socialization as a “process by which social interaction leads novices to endorse 
expected ways of thinking, feeling and acting” (Johnston, 2001: 493) or as the “adaptation of certain 
rules of behaviour, ‘ways of doing things’, stemming from interaction with members of the same 
group” (Juncos/Pomorska 2007) or „a social process through which agent properties and preferences 
change as a result of interaction“ (Checkel, 2003, 211, see also Beyers, 1998, 5).   10
groups, in Coreper and even in the Council itself.
15  
Up until today this mechanism contributed to the often cited “esprit de corps” that 
characterizes the atmosphere within the different structures of the Council and helps 
to prevent institutional deadlock even under the conditions of an enlarged Union. 
This esprit de corps among representatives to the Council and its preparatory bodies 
arises from a variety of supporting factors. Niemann summarizes them as follows: 
“A strongly shared ‘lifeworld’ amongst negotiators, uncertainty and lack of 
knowledge, technical or cognitively complex issues, the presence of persuasive 
individuals and low levels of politicization” (2004, 379).  The factor that is most 
often cited by scholars and practitioners is the “strongly shared lifeworld”. Being 
embedded in EU level structures, separated in time and space from the primary 
institutional affiliations back home EU officials adapt to their surroundings in 
Brussels (Egeberg, 1999). Most representatives know each other for many years, 
call each other by their first names and even take trips together as for example the 
Antici-group at the beginning of each new Presidency. They have a large number of 
formal and informal meetings, be it in offices, meeting rooms or in the corridors 
and cafeterias of the Justus-Lipsius-building; they are in constant contact through 
phone and email.
16  S o m e  o f  t h e m  a l s o  m e e t  during free time doing sports or 
attending cultural events and their children go to the same school. As a 
consequence, friendships develop among the members of the 27 permanent 
representations in Brussels, which helps to understand views and perspectives of the 
others and to learn about specific cultural backgrounds of certain issues in the 
other’s country. Even marriages among council civil servants have occurred 
(Westlake/Galloway 2004: 227). In addition, the adoption of the termini tecnici of 
daily working life in the Council’s surrounding leading to a certain “eurospeak” 
distinguishes the Brussels based representatives from other civil servants and 
contributes to the development of a specific group identity as in a “club of friends” 
(int. 14, 7-7). As a consequence, officials from the permanent representations “have 
a special feeling of responsibility for the EU. If we cannot find the solution, usually 
it is not possible for ministers in their limited time either” – as an ambassador from 
a new member states reported (int. 43). In short a Mertens-Counsellor summarizes 
this process as follows: “Of course, after some years your attitudes change” (int. 37, 
54-56). 
This altogether results in Council representatives being adequately described as “an 
epistemic community with shared values based on commonly-held knowledge and 
expertise“ (Christiansen 2001: 24).
17 Both researchers and practitioners speak of a 
                                                 
15 Lewis 1998; 2000; 2002, and 2005; Egeberg/Schäfer/Trondal, 2003; Morisse-Schilbach 2006; 
Haibach, 2000. 
16 For socialization through meetings, norms and the reproduction of role perceptions see also Lewis 
1998; Beyers/Dierickx 1998; Pag 1987; Kerremans 1996. 
17 Thomas Christiansen emphasizes the role of common allegiances to the EU and common loyalties 
of all EU officials, a common bureaucratic culture and the role of epistemic communities in highly 
technical policy areas and he argues that common views on the EU are shared by officials in the 
Commission and in the Council although commonly one is being seen as the defender of European 
interests and the other is seen as the intergouvernmental defender of the national interests of the 
member states (Christiansen, 2001, 23).   11
“club mentality” (Hayes-Renshaw 1997: 90; Johnson 1998: 43; Niemann 2004: 
390) and “thick trust” between representatives especially in the Coreper (vgl. Lewis 
2000), true empathy, a deliberative atmosphere and a shift of loyalty from the 
national to the supranational level (Beyers, 1998, 7; Kerremans, 1996; Laffan, 
1998).
18 Thus, negotiations at all levels in the Council exceed purely strategic 
action and analytical concepts such as “bargaining” or “strategic action” more and 
more fail to describe decision-making processes in the Council. An example of the 
effectiveness of this mechanism of socialization is the voting behaviour of the 
Swedish delegation after Swedish accession to the Union. In the first year after 
accession Swedish ministers in the Council voted against decisions very frequently. 
Hayes-Renshaw, van Aken and Wallace give a plausible explanation: “Swedish 
ministers were carrying over voting behaviour from the UN context. As reported to 
us by one insider, ‘they soon learned the difference’” (2006, 183). 
A very pressing question was whether this mechanism of socialization and – as a 
consequence – European-minded consensus among officials from the permanent 
representations could be maintained after the rounds of enlargement in 2004 and 
2007 in the course of which all Council bodies almost doubled their size. But 
socialization of the new member states began long before enlargement actually took 
place in May 2004. Already one year before, the candidate countries’ 
representatives were integrated in the regular Council decision-making processes, 
the only difference to the member states being that their votes were not counted.  
A member of the German delegation summarizes this mechanism of socialization as 
follows: “The Council working groups have their own dynamic of socialization. If 
you are member of such a working group, this dynamic of socialization captures 
you. […] Nobody can evade this dynamic” (int. 33, 36-38). 
The Mechanism of Reciprocity 
The second mechanism that may help to explain both the striking absence of 
deadlock in the enlarged Council and the partial and latent supranationalization of 
this body is the mechanism of reciprocity. This mechanism exists in two modes: 
specific and unspecific. Specific reciprocity means the negotiation of package-
deals. One delegation accepts concessions to another delegation in one dossier but 
expects the other delegation to accommodate its wishes in another. This can be the 
case on the level of the working groups, but it is more widely practised in those 
units within the Council structure that possess broad horizontal competences, in 
particular the Coreper, the Council for General Affairs or the European Council. A 
representative from the Swedish permanent representation said: “Sometimes […] I 
call Stockholm and say: ‘Maybe if we give up on that, we might gain here. Perhaps 
we should see the larger picture; perhaps if we help the French here, maybe they 
will help us on that’” (int. 10, 49-60). Specific reciprocity is commonplace in many 
                                                 
18 Others observe a „club mentality“ (int. 44, 35-35), a „corporate culture“ (Ruggie, 1993) or a 
certain “crew-geist” (int. 56, 6-6) in the Council that is due to socialization processes. However, 
“one can say, that people from the permanent representations have developed a stronger ‘teamgeist’ 
than people from the capitals. Everything runs faster, more professionally, more smoothly, less 
cumbersome” (int. 53, 18-19).   12
international and national institutions, though, and by no means specific for the 
Council. What is specific for the preparatory bodies of the Council – and at the 
same time much less typical for international institutions in general – is the broad 
acceptance of unspecific (or diffuse) reciprocity. Jeffrey Lewis describes this 
mechanism as follows: „If you help someone they will remember. There is an 
institutional memory within the possibilities available” (Lewis, 2000, 268). On the 
basis of the high level of mutual understanding and trust that has been described 
above, national delegations expect that if they negotiate in a compromising and 
friendly way, the other delegations would do the same. Many interviewees 
confirmed the existence and the effectiveness of this mechanism: A representative 
from the Austrian permanent representation said: “It is impossible to present 
yourself as uncompromising in the Council, as someone who rigorously goes his 
own way. Sometimes you have to compromise, sometimes you have to do things a 
little bit against your preferences in order to get support from the others in areas, 
that are more important to you. The Council is a much more flexible and dynamic 
body than other international organizations” (int. 9, 80-80) This view is shared by a 
member of the Slovak permanent representation: “Permanent Representatives have 
a special feeling of responsibility for the EU. […] We do our best and we always 
look for compromise and solutions. So there clearly is a willingness to 
compromise” (int. 43 69-84). All interviewees agreed in the point that without 
diffuse reciprocity and a generally compromising way of negotiation decision-
making in the Council would hardly be possible. The “club identity” especially in 
the Coreper but also in Council working groups and the Council itself is a necessary 
condition for this mechanism of unspecific reciprocity because it ensures that a 
delegation might get something in return at a later point in time (Wallace, 2002, 
333). Surprisingly most member states that joined the Union in 2004 or in 2007 
very quickly adapted to this approach of reciprocity, the only exception to date 
possibly being Poland which has taken a tougher stance in the Council according to 
many interviewees. 
The Mechanism of Lack of Interest 
Before the last two rounds of enlargement in 2004 and 2007 most researchers and 
most practitioners agreed in their view that the more participants the Council has, 
the more difficult it would be for the presidency to reach a consensus or even a 
qualified majority, the underlying assumption being that the more members a group 
has, the more heterogeneous would be the interests and preferences, that are present 
within this group. This assumed correlation between the degree of intra-group 
heterogeneity and the probability of institutional deadlock, however, obviously does 
not exist in the enlarged Council. It has not been true because of the mechanism of 
lack of interest. In short, this mechanism can be described as follows: With 
enlargement in 2004 many small states joined the European Union. The probability 
that a small member state is directly concerned by a specific dossier in the Council 
is comparatively low. Estonia has little national interests in dossiers concerning 
transfer routes through the Alps or EU subsidies for oranges and bananas from   13
Réunion or Gouadeloupe.
19 Moreover, it is often observed that member states that 
do not have specific interests in a dossier or that are not affected by a decision in the 
Council tend to support the position of the presidency and generally vote for the 
position of the majority of states (or for the original Commission initiative in the 
very early stages of negotiations in the Council working parties). Consequently, if 
the relative number of small states within the EU rises, the number of delegations 
without specific interests in any particular dossier increases and – as a consequence 
– the number of delegations that are ready to accept proposals from the Presidency. 
Therefore it becomes easier for the Presidency to reach a qualified majority, which 
is exactly the opposite of what was expected before enlargement. This, again, 
strengthens the position of the Presidency as a quasi-supranational actor within the 
Council. So the statement stays true: “the more member states, the more powerful is 
the presidency” (int. 2, 5-9). 
A member of the German Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs who is responsible 
for formulating instructions to the permanent representation in Brussels describes 
this mechanism as follows: „Basically, there is only a limited number of member 
states who are really engaged in any particular topic. And there are relatively many 
member states – after enlargement even more – that are only interested in a small 
number of dossiers. So if you have a proposal on Cyprus, you can be quite sure that 
the Greek will have to say something. But if we are talking about milk quota for 
Nordic countries you won’t hear anything from the Greek. Here the Finn will make 
himself heard. However, the Finn will not be actively involved in discussions 
concerning Mediterranean sheep. On the other hand, the German delegation is 
interested in almost every dossier. Usually, there are four or five, sometimes six 
delegation that follow a dossier with some enthusiasm. The others simply 
communicate that they can live with any compromise” (int. 30, 13-14).  
Such behaviour is often observed not only with small member states but also with 
new member states. An Austrian delegate reports that “the majority of the new 
member states acts very cautious in most dossiers” (int. 47, 87-88). And she 
continues that they very often do not take the floor, simply because they are not 
directly concerned by a dossier. In these cases they refrain from arguing and simply 
show their readiness to accept any compromise reached by the Presidency.  
The Mechanism of Presidential Impartiality 
In the center of the mechanism of Presidential impartiality stands the observation 
that when a member state holds the Couhncil Presidency, it is at the same time very 
powerful and very much committed to a higher European goal and not to its 
national preferences. The informal idée directrice is those of the impartial 
Presidency. Consequently, the Presidency is powerful but cannot use its power for 
its national preferences (int. 57). “In every seminar on the Presidency, delegates are 
                                                 
19 The bigger member states are in a different position here. Firstly they are directly envolved in 
most of the dossiers, secondly dossiers most of the time have an impact on net-payers and thirdly – 
as a member of the German permanent representation points out – bigger members are expected to 
take a stance on issues: „They want to know how the biggest member sees a certain issue; they want 
to know what Germany is at“ (int. 24, 13-13).   14
told that during the Presidency the national interests of their country must step back 
because the Presidency should be neutral, and should push the institutional interest 
of the Council and at least a notion of European interest” (int. 3, 165-166). In short 
the mechanism of presidential impartiality works as follows:  
1.  The Presidency is a very powerful actor within the Council.
20 It possesses a 
great variety of procedural powers such as the competence to shape the 
agenda within the Council working groups and to steer the decision-making 
processes within the Council as well as the interaction between Council, 
Commission, European Parliament and individual member states. More 
important, it “determines how dossiers are handled and when to refer it to a 
higher level. This is the most effective resource of power of the presidency” 
(int. 29, 10-20 vgl. also int. 27, 34-38).  
2.  Every Presidency wants to be perceived as a “good” Presidency. If it uses 
the procedural power of the Presidency to push its national interests, it is 
commonly evaluated as a “bad Presidency” whereas “European-minded” 
Presidencies are generally perceived as “good presidencies.” Although there 
is no official evaluation programme for Presidencies neither by the Council 
secretariat or the Commission nor by any other body, there is a lot of 
informal talking. You “talk to your colleague, your Dutch colleague or your 
German colleague. When you talk about the Austrians you say: ‘Do you 
think it was good, do you think it was bad?’ It is very informal” (int. 10, 20-
20). An Austrian delegate explains: “A Presidency that tries to use its role as 
president for pushing specific national interests will not be a successful 
Presidency” (int. 9, 69-76). And he continues that the main criterion for the 
evaluation of a Presidency is whether it “brought things forward”. 
3.  Therefore the Presidency has strong incentives to rather use its Presidential 
powers for pushing European interests – however this might be defined. 
Generally the quantity of decisions reached under a Presidency has for a 
long time been the most important criteria for evaluation. Today it is more 
about the number of important or difficult dossiers that a Presidency brings 
to a decision.  
4.  Since decisions against the Commission generally require a unanimous vote 
(Art. 250(1) TEC), the Presidency has a strong incentive to cooperate 
closely with the Commission and to support Commission initiatives. The 
Presidency and the Commission often share the same interest, namely: 
closing dossiers (int. 12, 63-64). This, again, strengthens the position of the 
Commission within the Council and its substructures.  
The mechanism of presidential impartiality not only helps to prevent deadlock in 
the Council because the most powerful actors within the Council have strong 
incentives to reach a compromise, but also leads to supranational commitments of 
the Presidency. Consequently, the Presidency can be adequately described as a 
“quasi-supranational actor” within the Council. If, however, the most powerful 
actors within the Council, namely the Presidency, the Commission and the General 
                                                 
20 See especially Tallberg 2000; 2003 and 2004 as well as int. 58, 14-18.   15
secretariat are clearly supranational in its basic orientation, the picture of the 
Council as a purely intergovernmental body goes wrong. The impact of the 
mechanism of presidential impartiality brings the Council more towards the idée 
directrice of supranationality. It leads to a higher “actor quality” of the Council in 
relation to the member states, it helps both the general acceptance and the actual 
functioning of majority decisions and it leads to more autonomy of the delegates 
within the Council from their respective capitals. Sometimes member states 
completely refrain from giving instructions to their delegations during the 
Presidency. “It is good form, that member states do not hijack the power of the 
Presidency for their national agenda” (int. 47, 12-18).  
As a consequence of this mechanism, the Presidency always votes in favour of a 
compromise reached. From 1999 to 2006 there were only 11 cases where the 
Presidency has voted against a decision that was still adopted.
21 Since March 2004 
it has never happened that the Presidency voted against a decision that was finally 
adopted by the Council. The Presidency therefore can be considered as an actor 
who promotes not national interests, but rather the institutional interest of the 
Council and thereby also a kind of “European interest” – however this might be 
defined (int. 3 7-7; int. 39, 118-125).  
Summary 
In this paper we argued that the often predicted and widely feared deadlock did not 
occur within the Council after the two rounds of enlargement in 2004 and 2007. 
Moreover, the expectation that procedures within the Council would become more 
intergouvernmental and – as a consequence – decision-making would become more 
complicated did not come true. The feared uncompromising behaviour of the new 
member states did not occur; a representative from the Danish permanent 
representation even argues: “If you ask me whether [enlargement] gives rise to any 
particular difficulties or problems in terms of efficiency of the Council, my answer 
is: no. In the Council and the Coreper sometimes we have difficulties in agreeing on 
certain dossiers or in advancing in certain fields. This, however, is not due to the 
new member states - it is normally due to old member states. It's the old member 
states, and mostly, it's the big, old member states who block in cases where 
something cannot be advanced” (int. 49, 38-38). New member states have come in 
“smoothly” and enlargement happened “surprisingly well” (int. 42, 34-35).  
Why was that the case? We argue that four institutional mechanisms contribute to 
the smooth running of Council, Coreper and Working groups even with 27 
delegations: Through socialization new members quickly get familiarized with 
Council working practice and thus pick up the existing “esprit de corps” which is a 
prerequisite for the smooth and efficient decision-making in the Council. Thick 
trust, willingness to compromise, and a deliberate atmosphere contribute to work 
habits that make it possible to handle even delicate issues surprisingly well. The 
mechanism of specific and unspecific reciprocity is based on dense socialization 
                                                 
21 Irland twice in 2004, Greece twice in 2003, Belgium twice in 2001, Italy, Spain, Sweden, France 
and Germany once each in 2003, 2002, 2001, 2000 and 1999.   16
and is a system of mutual help that from time to time even implies the readiness of 
national delegations to step back from own national preferences. The mechanism of 
the  Lack of interest helps to proceed on topics where a significant number of 
member states are not involved. Member states without any position on a certain 
topic can use their voice and offer it to one of the shifting coalitions for reciprocity 
(and later get support on a topic that they are engaged in) or simply follow the 
position of the Presidency or the Commission. The mechanism of presidential 
impartiality contributes to a strong quasi-supranational agent within the Council 
who strives to get important dossiers done for the reward of being considered “a 
good Presidency”.  
The combination of these mechanisms contributes to a slight but remarkable shift 
towards a supranational idée directrice and helps to overcome the danger of 
institutional deadlock. Officials do not try to push their national interest no matter 
what but also feel a responsibility for the EU as a whole. “The argument: ‘we do not 
like that because we do not like that’, is not a European argument; people here do 
not accept this” (int. 42, 33-33). National delegations have to adapt their negotiation 
strategies to this newly emerging quasi-supranational idée directrice of the Council 
of the European Union. 
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